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Implementations of many quantum communication protocols require sources of photon pairs. However, op-
timization of the properties of these photons for specific applications is an open problem. We theoretically
demonstrate the possibility of extending the maximal distance of secure quantum communication when a pho-
ton pair source and standard fibers are used in a scenario where Alice and Bob do not share a global time
reference. It is done by manipulating the spectral correlation within a photon pair and by optimizing chromatic
dispersion in transmission links. Contrary to typical expectations, we show that in some situations the secure
communication distance can be increased by introducing some extra dispersion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While in theory quantum communication (QC) protocols
can provide their legitimate participants (traditionally called
Alice and Bob) with an unconditionally secure way of ex-
changing information, numerous imperfections in the cur-
rently available setup elements impose a strong limitation on
the secure distance of practical implementations [1]. One of
the most basic requirements to realize many QC protocols is
a source of photon pairs. These sources are usually based on
nonlinear optical processes such as spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC) [2–4] and four-wave mixing [8, 9].
Although utilization of photon pair sources in the QC field
has been very popular, optimization of the properties of the
produced photons has not yet been analyzed exhaustively.
Only recently, it was shown that changing the type of spec-
tral correlation between the photons propagating in a disper-
sive medium can lead to reduction of the temporal width of
the wavepacket arriving at the detection system [10]. This
observation was subsequently used to improve the security
of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols performed in a
symmetric setup configuration where a source of photon pairs
is located exactly in the middle between Alice and Bob.
In this paper, we consider an asymmetric QKD setup con-
figuration presented in Fig. 1. We show that it is possible
to extend the maximal security distance between the source
and Bob’s laboratory by 1) manipulating the spectral correla-
tion within a pair of photons and 2) optimizing the amount of
chromatic dispersion introduced by Alice’s part of the setup.
Such an improvement can be observed only in the case when
the legitimate participants of the QKD protocol use tempo-
ral filtering to reduce the detection noise, but the global time
reference according to which the source produces photons is
not accessible to them. Therefore, our work particularly ap-
plies to the case of realistic quantum communication with lim-
ited resources, when the amount of strong classical signals
exchanged between the source and the two parties during the
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FIG. 1. Sketch of the asymmetric QKD scheme with the source of
photon pairs located outside of the laboratories of the legitimate par-
ticipants of the protocol.
protocol is severely restricted. It can be seen as a very im-
portant case from the point of view of possible commercial
applications.
II. QKD SETUP
In the setup configuration presented in Fig. 1 the source of
photon pairs is placed outside of laboratories of the partici-
pants of QKD protocol. Although it is less popular than the
standard scheme in which the source is owned by Alice, the
security of such setup configuration has also been analyzed
in the past. In particular, it was shown that the total secu-
rity distance between Alice and Bob can be the longest if the
source is placed exactly in the middle between them [11, 12].
Nowadays this type of scheme is often utilized for device-
independent QKD [13, 14]. It is also useful for quantum net-
works, particularly with star topology [15, 16].
In this manuscript we theoretically consider realization of
the standard BB84 protocol [17] using the scheme pictured in
Fig. 1. However, it should be mentioned here that the method
for improving quantum communication security investigated
in our work is much more universal. It can be implemented
with any other QKD protocol utilizing SPDC source of pho-
ton pairs and dispersive quantum channels in analogous setup
configuration. Since the source is located outside of the labo-
ratories of Alice and Bob, a potential eavesdropper (Eve) can
have access both to the photon travelling to Bob and to the
one travelling to Alice. Therefore, in the security analysis of
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2the scheme illustrated in Fig. 1 we assume that Eve can per-
form the most powerful (i.e. collective) attacks on all of the
photons.
For simplicity of calculations we assume that the source,
pumped by a pulsed laser, produces a single pair of photons
in every attempt. The characteristic spectral widths of those
photons are σA = σB = 1.5THz. We assume that the source
does not distribute global time reference to Alice and Bob, so
that neither of the parties knows the emission time of a given
pair of photons. This assumption can be justified by point-
ing out that in realistic situation sending the global time refer-
ence signal to the legitimate participants of the QKD protocol
can be challenging. This requires either using two separate
fibers connecting the source with each one of them (one for
quantum and the other one for classical transmission) or send-
ing strong classical signals in the same fibers as the single
photons. While the first solution may be unreasonable from
the economical point of view [19–21], the second one intro-
duces strong limits on the maximal security distance because
of excessive channel noise, caused mainly by the effect of Ra-
man scattering [22–24]. Thus, it may become necessary for
commercial applications to perform quantum communication
without global time reference distribution, just as we assume
in this work.
Our further assumption is that in order to generate the key,
Alice and Bob measure the polarization of the photons sent
from the source to their detection systems. Each of them uses
two free-running single-photon detectors with a dark count
rate d = 1kHz. For the basic security analysis, presented in
the main body of our manuscript, we assume that dark counts
are the only source of errors in the considered scheme. This
means, in particular, that there is no polarization misalign-
ment between Alice and Bob. The opposite situation is briefly
considered in the Appendix A, where we show that the pres-
ence of this additional type of errors does not change the re-
sults of our work in qualitative way. Throughout this arti-
cle, we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s links are made of stan-
dard single-mode fibers (SMFs) of length LA and LB , respec-
tively, with attenuation coefficient αA = αB = 0.2 dB/km
and group velocity dispersion (GVD) equal to 2βA = 2βB =
−2.3× 10−23s2/km, unless stated otherwise.
We have chosen SMFs to be the default type of quantum
channels in the presented QKD security analysis because they
are inexpensive and widely used in existing telecommunica-
tion networks. Therefore, they are the best candidates for
commercial quantum communication schemes implementa-
tions. A brief comparison of the performance of SMFs with
other possible types of dispersive channels is performed in
Sec. V.
III. TEMPORALWIDTHS OF SPDC PHOTONS
For the reduction of errors originating from the dark counts
Alice and Bob can apply temporal filtering [18]. If the lo-
cal clocks used by them are synchronized with each other this
procedure can be performed even in the situation when the in-
formation on the emission times of pairs of photons generated
by the source is not available to them. The only restriction
in this case is that the participants of a given QC protocol
cannot effectively use gated detectors. Instead, they should
utilize free-running detectors to register all of the incoming
signals and then filter them during the post-processing stage
of the protocol, retaining only those measurement results that
can be successfully paired in terms of detection time. It is
worth noting here that applying temporal filtering in the way
described above does not introduce significant losses of real
signals, which are inevitably present in the case of most other
methods of temporal shaping of SPDC photons [25–27]. It is
because in those methods the heralding photons are typically
filtered by some kind of temporal or spectral modulator. Such
filtering results in significant decrease of the heralding effi-
ciency, which is disadvantageous for long-distance quantum
communication.
In order to quantify the temporal width of a photon heralded
by the detection of the other photon from a given SPDC pair
in the case when their emission time is not known we adopt
the mathematical formalism developed in Ref. [10]. However,
instead of the propagated biphoton wavefunction given by the
formula (4) in Ref. [10] we start with more general version of
the wavefunction, namely
ψLALB (t1, t2) =
i
√
σAσB
4
√
1− ρ2√−pi [g(−xAxB) + i(xA + xB)]×
× exp
[
− zAt
2
1 + zBt
2
2 + 2σAσBρt1t2
2 [g(−xAxB) + i(xA + xB)]
]
, (1)
where g(x) = 1 + x(1− ρ2), xY = 2σ2Y βY LY and
zY = 2iσ
2
Aσ
2
BβY LY
(
1− ρ2)+ σ2Y (2)
for Y = A,B. In the formula (1) the parameter ρ denotes
the so-called spectral correlation coefficient, which indicates
the type and strength of the spectral correlation generated be-
tween the SPDC photons. After performing analogous calcu-
lation as in Ref. [10] we arrive at the following expression
for the temporal width of the photon entering Bob’s measure-
ment system in the case when he has the information on the
detection time of the photon sent to Alice but the global time
reference is unavailable to him:
τh =
√
[g(x2A)σ2B+g(x2B)σ2A+2g(−xAxB)σAσBρ]
2σ2Aσ
2
B[g(x2A)g(x2B)−[g(−xAxB)]2ρ2]
×
√
[g(−xAxB)]2 + (xA + xB)2. (3)
It is worth noting that the formula (3) remains identical when
the subscripts A and B are interchanged. This is consistent
with the intuition which suggests that it does not matter if it is
Bob who uses the information on Alice’s detection events to
select the matching clicks or the situation is opposite.
IV. SECURITY OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
The most basic quantity commonly used to define the secu-
rity of QKD protocols is the key generation rate, K [28]. For
3the BB84 protocol realized with the setup illustrated in Fig. 1
its lower bound is given by:
K = pexp [1− 2H(QBER)] , (4)
whereH(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon
entropy. The quantity pexp denotes the probability that both
Alice and Bob get a click at least in one of their detectors
after the emission of a single pair of photons and accept this
event for the process of key generation. The quantum bit error
rate, QBER, represents the ratio of different bits (i.e. errors)
in Alice’s and Bob’s versions of the raw key to the number of
all the bits.
In order to calculate pexp let us first consider the situation
in which both photons emitted by the source in a single SPDC
event successfully arrive at the detectors of the legitimate par-
ticipants of the protocol. If Alice and Bob did not use tem-
poral filtering method, then all such events would have been
accepted for the key generation process. In the opposite case
the acceptance probability depends on the duration time of a
single detection window set by them. If it is equal to ξτh,
where τh is the temporal width of the heralded photon at the
entrance to the detector, this probability reads
η(ξ) = (2pi)−1/2
∫ ξ/2
−ξ/2
dy exp(−y2/2) = erf(ξ/2
√
2). (5)
Thus, the probability for both photons of a given SPDC pair
to arrive at the detectors and be accepted during temporal fil-
tering procedure can be calculated as
P sign++ = TATBη(ξ), (6)
where TA (TB) is the transmittance of the quantum channel
connecting the source with Alice (Bob). If Alice’s link is
characterized by an attenuation coefficient αA, then TA =
10−αALA/10. The formula for Bob’s link transmittance, TB ,
is analogous.
For the detection window duration time of ξτh, the prob-
ability to register a dark count in a detector characterized by
the dark count rate d can be calculated as
Ph(ξ) = dξτh. (7)
Since in realistic situations it is always Ph(ξ) 1, the proba-
bility that a pair of clicks coming from the real SPDC photons
do not match, but a given event is nevertheless accepted by
Alice and Bob due to a dark count registered by one of their
detectors inside the detection window is
P dc++ ≈ 4TATB [1− η(ξ)]Ph(ξ), (8)
where the factor 4 comes from the overall number of detectors
used by the legitimate participants of the protocol.
Let us now consider an event in which Alice’s photon ar-
rives at her measurement system and Bob’s photon is lost. The
probability for such case to be accepted for the key generation
process, due to the dark count in one of Bob’s detectors, can
be approximated by
P+− ≈ 2TA(1− TB)Ph(ξ). (9)
Analogously, the probability for accepting an event in which
Alice’s photon is lost and the click in her detection system is
caused by a dark count reads
P−+ ≈ 2(1− TA)TBPh(ξ). (10)
Finally, the probability for a pair of dark counts to be reg-
istered in Alice’s and Bob’s measurement systems with such
synchronicity that they can be mistakenly accepted by the le-
gitimate participants of the protocol, instead of the real pho-
tons which are both lost, calculated per one attempt to gener-
ate a bit of the key is
P−− ≈ (1− TA)(1− TB)2d
R
2Ph(ξ), (11)
where R is the repetition rate of the SPDC source. For the
purpose of estimating the lower bound for the key generation
rate we assume here that R = 200MHz, which is low enough
to ensure that the temporal modes of the subsequent photons
sent to either of the parties do not overlap at the entrance to
the detectors.
Using the quantities defined above, the probability pexp for
the analyzed scheme can be written as
pexp = P
sign
++ + P
dc
++ + P+− + P−+ + P−−. (12)
Since dark counts occur in the detectors of Alice and Bob ran-
domly, there is 50% chance for an error in Bob’s version of
the key in all of the cases when at least one of the matching
clicks is caused by a dark count. On the other hand, in the
opposite situation Alice and Bob can be sure that their results
are perfectly correlated. Therefore, the QBER is calculated
using the formula
QBER =
pexp − P sign++
2pexp
. (13)
V. OPTIMAL DISPERSION ADVANTAGE
In our previous work [10] we assumed that the detection
windows used by Alice and Bob are always six times longer
than the temporal widths of the measured photons. This
choice can be justified by the fact that it allows Alice and Bob
to minimize the number of registered errors while retaining
nearly 100% probability for a successful detection of the real
signals. However, it is not always optimal for the security of
quantum communication, especially if the ratio of signal to
noise is relatively small. It can be seen in Fig.2, where the
lower bound for the secure key generation rate that can be ob-
tained by using the QKD scheme presented in Fig.1 is plotted
as a function of the length of Bob’s link for a few different val-
ues of ξ. From this picture it is clear that in order to extend the
maximal security distance Alice and Bob should choose very
short detection windows, even if it results in discarding a lot of
signal photons. Therefore, during the calculations performed
in this work we optimized the value of ξ for every possible
distances of Alice’s and Bob’s links in order to maximize the
key generation rate.
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FIG. 2. The lower bound of the key generation rate K that can be
obtained by Alice and Bob when using the QKD setup pictured in
Fig.1, plotted as a function of Bob’s link length LB for ξ = 12
(yellow, solid line), ξ = 6 (red, dashed line), ξ = 3 (green, dotted
line), ξ = 1 (blue, dot-dashed line) and for the numerically optimized
ξ (black, solid line). All of the plots were made for ρ = 0.9 and
LA = 1km.
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FIG. 3. The lower bound of the key generation rate K that can be
obtained by Alice and Bob when using the QKD setup pictured in
Fig.1. It is plotted as a function of Alice’s link length LA. The plots
show simulation results for fixed correlation coefficient ρ = 0.9 and
five different lengths of Bob’s link, LB , as indicated in the picture.
Intuitively, one would expect that extending the length of
the fiber connecting the source with Alice, while keeping
Bob’s link fixed, would always decrease the key generation
rate. It is because the longer Alice’s link is the more losses
of signal photons are observed by the trusted parties during
their transmission. Furthermore, more losses means more op-
portunities for the potential eavesdropper to perform her at-
tacks. However, in some situations this conclusion turns out
to be valid only when the length of Bob’s link is small enough.
Such a situation is illustrated in Fig. 3, where the key genera-
tion rate, calculated for a correlation factor ρ = 0.9, is plotted
as a function of Alice’s link length LA for different values of
Bob’s link length LB . Surprisingly, when LB approaches the
maximal security distance, the generation of a secure key is
impossible for small LA, while it is still possible for a limited
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FIG. 4. Maximal length LB of Bob’s link plotted as a function of the
length LA of Alice’s link and the spectral correlation coefficient ρ,
for which it is possible for the trusted parties to generate a secure key
using the setup pictured in Fig.1. The values displayed in the figure
are given in kilometers.
range of longer LA.
This counterintuitive behaviour of the secure key genera-
tion rate can be explained in the following way. Since the
photons produced by the source do not have a single well-
defined wavelength, they are affected by temporal broadening
effect as they propagate through a dispersive medium. For a
long fiber, this phenomenon becomes the main factor influ-
encing the required duration time of the detection windows
used by the participants of the protocol in the temporal filter-
ing procedure. Those windows have to be accurately defined
to avoid losing a considerable number of signal photons. This
can be done only when the detection times of any pair of pho-
tons produced by the SPSC source are related to each other.
However, for large difference between the lengths of Alice’s
and Bob’s links this relation strongly depends on the wave-
lengths of the two photons. Therefore, if the fiber connecting
the source of photon pairs with Alice’s measurement system
is very short, the detection time of photons sent to her is not
as useful to Bob (and vice versa) as it is when LA and LB are
comparable with each other.
Nevertheless, in Fig. 3, one can see that the optimal value
of LA for a given LB always fulfills LA < LB . There is no
equality here because an increase in the length of Alice’s link
causes an increase in losses and errors in Alice’s measurement
system, which can wash out the advantage of additional dis-
persion before LA = LB . Notice here that in this work we
are only interested in the maximal security distance between
the source and Bob. If we would like to optimize the joint
distance between Alice and Bob, i.e. LA+LB , the fully sym-
metric setup configuration would obviously turn out to be the
best.
The extension of the maximal security distance LB by in-
creasing LA is only observed when the type of spectral corre-
lation within a photon pair is positive, as shown in Fig. 4. In
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FIG. 5. Logarithm of key generation rate, log10K, plotted as a function of dispersion and losses introduced in Alice’s link, calculated for
ρ = 0.9 and a)LB = 202 km, b)LB = 210 km and c)LB = 217 km. K is non-zero only in the colored area. Blue solid (dashed) line denotes
pairs of values of dispersion, βALA, and losses, αALA, introduced by a standard SMF fiber (high-dispersion fiber) of different lengths (see
text). Black dots correspond to the dispersion-introducing module [29].For the typical telecommunication photons with wavelength centered
around 1550 nm the dispersion value of 10−21 s2 on the horizontal scale corresponds to approximately 784 ns/nm.
this picture, the maximal secure length of Bob’s link is plot-
ted as a function of the length of Alice’s link and the spectral
correlation coefficient, ρ. When ρ ≤ 0, increasing LA always
leads to the reduction of the maximal secure value of LB be-
cause the detection windows for temporal filtering procedure
cannot be narrowed as much as they can when ρ > 0. For
negative spectral correlation this narrowing turns out to be in-
sufficient to overcome the negative effect of increasing signal
to noise ratio at Alice’s measurement system with growing
LA. Fig. 4 shows that for the chosen values of the setup pa-
rameters, it is possible to extend the maximal secure distance
(Bob’s link length) by about 10% (more than 20 km). In prac-
tice, this can be done by replacing a standard SPDC source,
which produces pairs of photons with negative spectral cor-
relation, with another source generating positively correlated
pairs [5–7, 30] and properly adjusting the length of Alice’s
link.
The results depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 correspond to the
case when both Alice’s link and Bob’s link are made of stan-
dard SMFs. Meanwhile, Fig. 5 illustrates the dependence of
the key generation rate, K, on the dispersion, βALA, and
losses, αALA, of photons introduced by Alice’s fiber, calcu-
lated for the spectral correlation coefficient ρ = 0.9 and three
different values of Bob’s link length, LB . This picture can
be very useful for experimentalists planning their own QKD
experiments, since it allows for the comparison of the perfor-
mance of any type of fiber with parameters αA and βA, as
long as the dispersion parameter has the same sign (i.e. pos-
itive) as the SMF utilized for Bob’s link. As an example, the
blue lines (βALA,αALA) plotted in Fig. 5 correspond to a
standard SMF fiber and a high-dispersion fiber with the same
attenuation coefficient and dispersion parameter magnitude as
the typical dispersion compensating fiber (DCF), but with op-
posite sign of the latter. From this picture, one concludes that
in our scheme, a high-dispersion fiber used as Alice’s link al-
lows for higher key generation rate than a standard SMF fiber.
Moreover, Fig. 5 allows one to compare the performance of
any fiber with other types of dispersion-introducing devices.
For example, the black dots visible in this picture represent
devices with the same parameters as commercial dispersion
compensation modules [29], except for the opposite sign of
the dispersion parameter. The results of our analysis suggest
that these modules have even better advantage for QKD ap-
plications than a high-dispersion fiber, although it would be
necessary for Alice to place more than one such element be-
tween the source and her detection system in order to reach the
necessary level of dispersion. Finally, it should be mentioned
that if the dispersion parameter of the device comprising Al-
ice’s link had opposite sign to the dispersion parameter of the
fiber used to build Bob’s link one would obtain exactly anal-
ogous picture as in Fig. 5 by taking ρ = −0.9. Therefore, in
this case, it would be beneficial for Alice and Bob to utilize
a standard SPDC source with a negative spectral correlation
coefficient.
An important issue that should be addressed in this secu-
rity analysis is the potential impact of the polarization drift
and thermal effects on the presented results. As it is widely
known, the polarization of photons can undergo unwanted ro-
tation during their propagation in standard telecommunica-
tion fibers. Since the angle of this rotation can fluctuate in
time, real-time polarization control systems are usually em-
ployed in realistic QC schemes in order to prevent the errors
caused by this effect from affecting the protocols. Similarly,
the lengths of Alice’s and Bob’s links, which can fluctuate due
to the temperature changes, should be monitored. This is es-
pecially important if the protocol requires high precission in
the measurement of the detection times of the photons sent to
Alice and Bob, like in the case analyzed in this paper. How-
ever, if we assume that the participants of the protocol want to
reduce the amount of classical signals exchanged between the
6SPDC source and their laboratories to the absolute minimum,
they may be forced to abandon the real-time monitoring pro-
cedure. Instead of this in the worst-case scenario the source
may be programmed to stop the key generation process from
time to time and send strong reference pulses to Alice and Bob
in order to enable realignment of their measurement systems.
As a sidenote it is worth mentioning here that the methods of
misalignment estimation are also known to benefit from quan-
tum correlation [31].
Fortunately, even in this scenario the results of our work
would be qualitatively the same as those presented above.
First of all, the main focus of this article is on the possible
extension of the maximal security distance between the SPDC
source and Bob, which is independent of the exact monitoring
procedure as long as it eliminates the polarization errors and
controls the length of the fibers to the sufficient degree. Thus,
the only effect of stoping the protocol from time to time in or-
der to realign the QKD setup would be the decrease of the key
generation rate, if it is non-zero. Moreover, the polarization
and temperature fluctuations in telecommunication fibers are
typically very slow comparing to the achievable repetition rate
of such setup, which means thatK would normally be reduced
only by a small fraction. Finally, in the appendix we briefly
analyze the security of the QKD scheme illustrated in Fig. 1,
assuming some misalignment of the polarization bases used
by Alice and Bob. We show there that the results presented
above would not be qualitatively changed in that scenario.
In this work we assume that the global time reference,
needed for Alice and Bob to identify the moment in time in
which the SPDC source generates a given pair of photons, is
not distributed to them. However, as we stated two paragraphs
above, once in a while the source can be allowed to generate
strong reference pulses needed to properly adjust the polariza-
tion bases and the lengths of Alice’s and Bob’s links. In this
situation one could wonder if those reference pulses could not
be also used as the time reference for the subsequent genera-
tion of SPDC pairs. To answer this quastion let us first note
that the pulses used for the realignment of Alice’s and Bob’s
setup are supposed to be emitted very rarely in comparison
with the signal pulses. Therefore, the participants of the pro-
tocol can use them as the reference for the emission time of
SPDC pairs of photons only if the source can be somehow
forced to generate those pairs with regular time intervals for a
relatively long period of time. However, this requirement may
be hard to fulfill in some realistic situations. Consider for ex-
ample a large quantum network, in which the SPDC source,
placed in an intermediate node, is utilized for quantum com-
munication between many pairs of users and/or some other
distant stations. Since the source’s repetition rate is typically
much smaller than the detection cycle of single-photon detec-
tors, it is more efficient to use the source to generate many
keys simultaneously instead of doing this one after the other.
In this case the time between the subsequent pairs of photons
sent to Alice and Bob may vary, e.g. due to the variable num-
ber of users communicating with the source at the same time.
If this is so, synchronizing the clocks of the two parties with
the clock of SPDC source during the setup realignment pro-
cedure would not be of much help for Alice and Bob.
VI. SUMMARY
In this work, we performed security analysis of the BB84
protocol to demonstrate how to extend the maximal security
distance between the source of photon pairs and one of the
parties (Bob) in an asymmetric QC scenario. To this end, we
utilized the idea of narrowing the temporal widths of photons
emitted from the source by manipulating the type of spectral
correlation introduced by the source, proposed in [10]. Sur-
prisingly, we found out that in some situations the improve-
ment can be notably larger if the other party (Alice) introduces
a certain amount of dispersion in her part of the setup. Such
an effect can be observed when the participants of the protocol
do not have access to the global time reference, but utilize the
procedure of temporal filtering to reduce the detection noise.
Moreover, we presented a figure showing the explicit compar-
ison of the performace of different dispersive setup elements
that can be used by Alice. The results of our work can be of
potential interest in the context of performing QC experiments
with the use of bright fibers populated by strong classical sig-
nals, possibly in realistic quantum networks schemes, since
temporal filtering can be especially useful to reduce the ex-
cessive channel noise generated in such fibers [18].
While extending the maximal security distance between the
source and only one of the participants of the QKD protocol,
which is the main focus of our work, can be considered as
rather unusual approach to QKD security analysis, there are
situations in which it can be particularly useful. A good ex-
ample would be complicated quantum network schemes com-
prised of several access networks connected to a backbone,
like the ones analyzed e.g. in Refs. [32, 33]. In such config-
urations sources of photon pairs, placed in the central node
of each star-topology access network, can be used not only
to distribute secure keys between individual users connected
directly to this particular node, but also to perform quantum
communication with the other access networks. Since it is nat-
ural to expect the distance between the neighbouring central
nodes to be several times larger than the distance between a
given node and an individual user connected to it, the scheme
for such communication would typically be highly asymmet-
ric. Therefore, according to the analysis presented in this
manuscript, in such case it can be possible to extend the max-
imal security distance between the neighbouring access net-
works just by adjusting the spectral correlation between the
photons emitted by the SPDC sources and increasing the dis-
persion introduced by short links connecting individual users
with the local central nodes. In this way one can be able to e.g.
provide secure communication scheme between two cities,
which are separated by such a long distance that it would be
impossible otherwise.
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Appendix A
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FIG. 6. The lower bound of the key generation rate K that can be
obtained by Alice and Bob when using the QKD setup pictured in
Fig.1, assuming that there is e = 5% for getting opposite results
from their measurements of a given pair of SPDC photons in the right
basis. The key generation rate is plotted as a function of Alice’s link
length LA. The plots show simulation results for fixed correlation
coefficient ρ = 0.9 and five different lengths of Bob’s link, LB , as
indicated in the picture.
All of the results of the analysis presented in this
manuscript were obtained with the assumption that the only
source of errors in the key generated by Alice and Bob are the
dark counts. However, one may ask how those results can be
influenced by the presence of other possible types of errors.
First of all, it is relatively straightforward to incorporate into
our model any types of errors that are uncorrelated with the
real signals. It can be done simply by assuming that d repre-
sents the total rate of this kind of errors, instead of only the
dark count rate. On the other hand, in order to account for
the errors that are related to the real signals, e.g. the ones
originating from the misalignment of Alice’s and Bob’s polar-
ization frameworks, one should modify the formula (13) for
QBER by adding the term eP sign++ /pexp to it, where e is the
probability that Alice and Bob will get opposite results from
their measurements of a pair of SPDC photons in the right
polarization basis.
While the problem with polarization misalignment can lead
to the reduction of the key generation rate and the maximal
security distance between the SPDC source and Bob, it does
not change the main conclusions that can be drawn from the
security analysis presented here. In particular, it still allows
for the significant extension of the maximal security distance
by proper adjustment of the length of Alice’s link, as can be
seen in Fig. 6. Comparing it with Fig. 3, shows that the results
of our work obtained for the cases of perfect and imperfect
alignment of Alice’s and Bob’s polarization frameworks are
qualitatively the same.
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